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NEARLY BLOWN AWAY: HOW POLICYHOLDERS AFFECTED BY HURRICANE KATRINA MAY
RECOVER UNDER THEIR HOMEOWNER’S INSURANCE POLICIES IN THE FACE OF ANTI-CONCURRENT
CAUSATION LANGUAGE

AUSTEN ENDERSBY

Introduction
We live in a world fraught with danger. For that reason, we purchase insurance policies
for our cars, our homes, our health, and our very lives, as a financial safeguard against future
tragedies. We do not, however, always take the time to read and fully understand the fine print.
When an individual purchases an “all-risk” homeowner’s insurance policy that contains certain
enumerated exclusions, she might safely assume that her claim will be denied if she is unlucky
enough to lose her house to an excluded peril; but she will likely assume that her loss will be
covered if a non-excluded risk damages the home. This train of thought sounds logical, but is it
entirely correct?
Not necessarily. The question becomes far more complicated when insured risks and
excluded perils act together to cause property damage. For example, assume that Harry
Homeowner lives in a suburb of Metropolis, U.S.A. Harry purchased an all-risk homeowner’s
insurance policy that covers fire damage, but contains an exclusion for losses caused by
earthquakes. One fateful day, a powerful earthquake rocked Metropolis, pulverizing buildings,
bridges, and pavement. The violent shockwaves caused a gas main to rupture and explode.
Before long, a massive fire spread rapidly and raged through the forests near Harry’s backyard.
Harry’s home, which had begun to shake violently in the quake, ended up burning to the ground
within minutes after the earthquake began. Will Harry’s insurance company cover the loss?
The answer to this question varies from state to state. In some jurisdictions, courts will
ascertain which of the several causes was most responsible for the loss and determine whether
the insurance policy covers that risk. This approach, known as the efficient proximate cause
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doctrine, is followed in most jurisdictions, 1 but different states apply different variations of the
rule.2 Thus, Harry would prevail in some states but would be denied coverage in others. In
addition, if Harry’s policy contains an anti-concurrent causation clause (“ACC clause”)—clever
language devised by insurance companies to circumvent the application of the efficient
proximate cause doctrine in a policyholder’s favor3—coverage may be denied even if the
covered risk (i.e., the fire) is primarily to blame for the loss. Some states have upheld ACC
clauses, whereas others have invalidated them.4 Against this complex web of divergent legal
rules and doctrinal subtleties, public adjusters must determine whether their clients are entitled to
recover under their policies—an increasingly difficult task since the advent of the ACC clause.5
This Essay traces the history and application of ACC clauses in property insurance
contracts, and seeks to address how, in spite of these clauses, public adjusters can effectively
advocate for policyholders whose homes were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Part I of this
Essay discusses the efficient proximate cause doctrine and explains how different jurisdictions
have defined the term “efficient proximate cause.”6 Part II of this Essay discusses the origin of
the ACC clause7 and the potential impact that these clauses have on a homeowner’s ability to
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4 DAVID L. LEITNER, REAGAN W. SIMPSON & JOHN M. BJORKMAN, LAW AND PRAC. OF INS. COVERAGE LITIG.
§ 52:33 (2007).
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See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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See infra Part II.b.
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Cf. RAWLE O. KING, POST-KATRINA INSURANCE ISSUES SURROUNDING WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSIONS IN
HOMEOWNERS’ INSURANCE POLICIES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at 19 (March 22, 2007) (noting that “claims
adjustment becomes more challenging” when multiple factors—some insured and others not—combine to cause a
loss).
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See infra Part I.
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See infra Part II.a.
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recover under his policy.8 In addition, Part II surveys the divergent judicial responses to the
ACC clause.9 Part III examines the impact of ACC clauses on Hurricane Katrina victims who
lost their homes in the storm.10 Finally, Part IV explores how public adjusters may handle their
Katrina-afflicted clients’ claims despite the ACC language that lurks in their insurance policies.11

I.

The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
The determination of whether an insured is covered for a particular loss under her

property insurance policy is not always cut and dried. When a single identifiable event causes
damage to property, the issue may be resolved rather quickly. Sometimes, however, two or more
events combine forces to damage a single piece of property. Disputes between an insured and
her insurance company are likely to arise when insured and non-insured risks act together to
cause property damage. In such situations, an insured may still recover despite the fact that an
excluded risk is partly responsible for her loss. Under the efficient proximate cause doctrine, an
insured is entitled to recover under her property insurance policy when a covered event and an
excluded risk concurrently cause damage to her property where the covered event is the efficient
proximate cause of the loss.12 The doctrine applies only to situations where multiple events in a
causal chain are each independently capable of causing the loss.13 Any homeowner embattled
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See infra Part II.b.
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See infra Part III.
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See infra Part IV.
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See Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 708 (Cal. 1989).
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See Pieper v. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1020 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“For the
efficient proximate cause theory to apply, . . . there must be two separate or distinct perils which could each, under
some circumstances, have occurred independently of the other and caused the damage”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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with her insurer would be wise to employ a public adjuster to establish whether the covered peril
that contributed to the loss constituted the efficient proximate cause of the loss.
Most jurisdictions have adopted some form of the efficient proximate cause rule.14 Some
jurisdictions define the “efficient proximate cause” as the first event in the causal chain that sets
the other causes in motion—i.e., the moving cause or initiating cause. 15 Under this approach, an
insured’s claim is covered if an insured risk is the “risk [that] set[s] the other causes in motion
which, in an unbroken sequence, produced the result for which recovery is sought.”16 Other
states hold that the efficient proximate cause is the predominant or most important cause in the
chain of events resulting in the property damage.17 The insured is entitled to recovery under this
approach only if she can prove that an insured risk was the predominant, or most important cause
of her loss.18
A handful of jurisdictions have instead adopted the concurrent causation doctrine,19
which allows recovery when multiple causes contribute to a loss so long as at least one cause is a
covered risk.20 Under this approach, the insured need not show that the covered peril was first in
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4 LEITNER, SIMPSON & BJORKMAN, supra note 1, at § 52.33.
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See, e.g., Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 1998); Burgess v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
334 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Burgess Farms v. New Hampshire Ins. Group, 702 P.2d 869, 873
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
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7 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 101:57 (3d ed. 1997).
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See, e.g., Garvey, 770 P.2d at 708.
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Id.
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Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Arizona are the only “true concurrent causation” states.
See 4 LEITNER, SIMPSON & BJORKMAN, supra note 1, at §52.33.

20

Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation versus Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party
Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 36 THE BRIEF 32, 33 (Winter 2007).
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the causal chain or that it predominates over the excluded causes.21 Rather, coverage exists as
long as a covered peril meaningfully contributed to the loss.22
Harry Homeowner’s misfortune is illustrative of the mechanics of the efficient proximate
cause and concurrent causation doctrines. Whether or not Harry recovers under his policy
depends on which event—the earthquake or the fire—is viewed as the efficient proximate cause
of the property damage. In states that hold that the efficient proximate cause is the moving or
initiating cause, the earthquake constitutes the efficient proximate cause of the loss, since the
earthquake was the first event in the causal chain which set in motion the gas main explosion and
the ensuing fire. Harry’s insurance policy will not cover the loss because the efficient proximate
cause of the damage is an excluded peril.
By contrast, the fire would most likely constitute the efficient proximate cause in
jurisdictions that apply the predominant or most important cause approach. Harry’s home had
begun to shake violently from the force of the earthquake, but was ultimately destroyed by fire.
Although the fire would not have started but for the earthquake, the fire is arguably the most
important and predominant reason for the destruction of Harry’s home. Harry’s insurance policy
will cover the loss because the efficient proximate cause of the damage is a covered risk.
Finally, if Harry’s misfortune occurred in a concurrent causation jurisdiction, his loss
would almost certainly be covered. Since a covered risk (the fire) contributed meaningfully to
Harry’s loss, Harry’s insurance company must cover the claim, despite the fact that a noncovered risk (the earthquake) also contributed to the loss.

21

See, e.g., Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. App. 1988) (“[T]he jury may find coverage where an
insured risk constitutes a concurrent cause of the loss even where ‘the insured risk [is] not the prime or efficient
cause of the accident.”’).
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Phillips & Coplen, supra note 20, at 34.
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II.

The Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause
a. Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses—Generally
Property insurers began to include ACC clauses in their policies to combat the ever-

increasing application of the concurrent and efficient proximate cause doctrines in favor of
policyholders.23 ACC clauses operate to completely deny coverage for losses caused
concurrently by a covered peril and an excluded peril—even where the covered peril is the
efficient proximate cause of the loss.24 A typical ACC clause provides: “We do not insure for
such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded event; or b) other causes of the loss; or c)
whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce
the loss.”25 In an all-risk property insurance policy, ACC language may lurk in a “lead in”
paragraph preceding the enumerated exclusions, within an enumerated exclusion, or may exist as
its own enumerated exclusion.26
In essence, the ACC clause is a clever device that insurance companies can employ to
“contract out” of the efficient proximate cause doctrine. In the words of one commentator, “[t]he
potential danger of the concurrent causation language is that the insurer will try to use it to turn a
policy providing all-risk coverage into one that provides no-risk coverage.”27 Thus, if Harry
Homeowner’s insurance policy contains such a clause, Harry’s claim may be denied in full
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4 LEITNER, SIMPSON & BJORKMAN, supra note 1, at § 52:9.

24

David J. Rosenberg, Kenneth M. Portner & Matthew Stool, Insurance Industry Woes in the Aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 141, 152 (April 2006).

25

See Insurance Services Office’s current Causes of Loss – Special Form (CP 10 30 04 02), accompanying ISO’s
Building and Personal Property Coverage Form (CP 00 10 04 02) (emphasis added).
26

Christopher L. Lynch, Concurrent Causation Exclusion: Don’t Let Your Insurer Turn Your All-Risk Coverage
Into No-Risk Coverage, THE RISK MANAGEMENT LETTER, Vol. 25, Issue 5 (2005).
27

Id.
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because an excluded peril (the earthquake) partially contributed to the destruction of his home,
even if the covered peril (the fire) is the efficient proximate cause of the loss.
b. Judicial Response to the Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause
The vast majority of states that embrace the efficient proximate cause doctrine have
upheld ACC clauses28 on the ground that they do not violate public policy.29 A number of
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have enforced ACC language as well. For example, in TNT
Speed & Sport Center, Inc. v. American States Insurance Co.,30 the Eighth Circuit held that the
ACC clause in American States’ insurance policy entitled it to deny recovery for water damage
to the insured’s property resulting from an act of vandalism to a levee system (an insured peril)
which caused a flood (an excluded peril), regardless of whether the vandalism was the efficient
proximate cause of the loss.31 The TNT Speed court surveyed Missouri cases and determined
that the ACC clause at issue did not offend state law.32 Finally, the court acknowledged that the
“plain meaning of the [ACC clause’s] exclusionary language was to directly address, and
contract out of, the efficient proximate cause doctrine.”33

28

4 LEITNER, SIMPSON & BJORKMAN, supra note 1, at § 52:9; see, e.g., State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925
P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1996); Assurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Jay-Mar, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (D.N.J. 1999)
(listing cases).
29

See, e.g., Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 P.2d 822, 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that parties may
“contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine without violating public policy”); Assurance Co. of America,
Inc. v. Jay-Mar, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (D.N.J. 1999) (“[T]here is no violation of public policy when parties
to an insurance contract agree that there will be no coverage for loss due to sequential causes even where the first or
the last cause is an included cause of loss.”).

30

114 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 1997).

31

TNT Speed & Sport Center, 114 F.3d at 732.

32

Id. at 732-33.

33

Id. at 733.
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Only a handful of efficient proximate cause jurisdictions—California,34 West Virginia,35
North Dakota,36 and Washington37—have held that ACC clauses are unenforceable. California
and North Dakota have invalidated ACC language by statute. Section 530 of the California
Insurance Code provides that:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was
the proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the
contract may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not
liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a
remote cause.38
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of Section 530 in Howell v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., holding that an insurance contract that attempts to contract around
the efficient proximate cause doctrine violates Section 530 and will not be enforced.39
Similarly, the North Dakota legislature codified the efficient proximate cause doctrine:
An insurer is liable for a loss proximately caused by a peril insured
against even though a peril not contemplated by the insurance
contract may have been a remote cause of the loss. An insurer is
not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a
remote cause. The efficient proximate cause doctrine applies only
if separate, distinct and totally unrelated causes contribute to the
loss.40
In Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. University of North Dakota, the North
Dakota Supreme Court added judicial weight to these words, emphasizing that North Dakota has

34

Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).

35

Murray v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998).

36

W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 643 N.W.2d 4 (N.D. 2002).

37

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).

38

CAL. INS. CODE § 530.

39

Howell, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.

40

N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2003).
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statutorily adopted the efficient proximate cause doctrine and holding that insurance companies
may not circumvent this legislative mandate.41
Even in the absence of a state statute, the highest courts in Washington and West Virginia
have invalidated ACC language. In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Hirschmann, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that an insurer may not employ exclusionary language in its
insurance policies to circumvent the efficient proximate cause doctrine.42 Finally, in Murray v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to
enforce an ACC clause because it was ambiguous and contrary to the reasonable expectations of
the insured party.43

III.

Hurricane Katrina—The Most Recent and Most Significant Disaster Involving
Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses
a. Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses and Hurricane Katrina
In late August 2005, the Gulf Coast of the United States endured one of the most

powerful and destructive natural disasters in American History—Hurricane Katrina. Torrential
rainfall and violent gusts of wind pummeled the U.S. Gulf Coast. Louisiana and Mississippi
bore the brunt of the storm’s wrath.44 In New Orleans, the levee system that was designed to
protect the city’s residents from floodwaters monumentally failed, submerging much of the

41

W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 643 N.W.2d 4, 7 (N.D. 2002).

42

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).

43

Murray v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 15 (W. Va. 1998).

44

See, e.g., Rhonda D. Orin, First-Party Coverage for Catastrophic Risks: Part I – Personal Lines, 758 PLI/LIT. 89,
99 (April-May 2007).
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city.45 The storm claimed nearly 2,000 lives,46 earning its place in history as one of the deadliest
hurricanes to hit the U.S.47 Katrina has caused approximately $150 billion in uninsured property
damage,48 and total insurance claims have neared $60 billion.49
In addition to the devastating loss of loved ones, homes, and priceless family possessions,
Katrina survivors must now deal with yet another disheartening blow: insurance carriers are
pointing to ACC clauses in homeowners’ property insurance policies as a justification for
denying property loss claims. To the sympathetic layman watching the Hurricane Katrina
coverage on television, the mass destruction appeared to originate from a single cause—the
hurricane itself.50 To the insurance industry, however, the damage was caused by a “series of
wholly separate and unrelated events,”51 including wind, rain, high water, waves, and storm
surges.52 Many insurance policies provide coverage for wind damage but not for water damage
caused by flooding and tidal waves. 53 The highest courts of Louisiana and Mississippi have

45

James A. Knox, Jr., Causation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 901, 904
(2006).
46

Tarak Anada, The Perfect Storm, an Imperfect Response, and a Sovereign Shield: Can Hurricane Katrina Victims
Bring Negligence Claims Against the Government?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 282 (2008) (“[O]ver 1,800 Americans
lost their lives during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.”).

47

Id.

48

Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe After Katrina, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 26, 26
(2006).
49

Id.

50

Orin, supra note 44, at 91.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

KING, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 1.
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adopted the efficient proximate cause doctrine54 and have allowed policyholders to recover under
their policies if a covered peril (e.g., wind) was the efficient proximate cause of their loss, even if
an excluded peril (e.g., flooding) contributed to the loss.55 However, insurance companies have
fortified their ability to deny claims by including ACC clauses in their policies.56
In New Orleans, for instance, thousands of homes were completely destroyed by
floodwaters that surged through the city after the levees broke. Many homeowners do not read
or fully understand their homeowner’s policies,57 and Katrina victims were shocked when
insurance companies denied their claims.58 In the absence of ACC language, aggrieved
policyholders could have successfully argued that the insured risks constituted the efficient
proximate cause of the loss; after all, it was the Category 5 winds, an insured risk, that set the
subsequent causes in motion.59 However, many Hurricane Katrina victims’ policies contain
ACC language which could completely bar recovery if an insured risk, such as wind damage,
acted concurrently with an excluded risk, such as floodwater, to cause a loss.60 Lawmakers in
states affected by Katrina have expressed their disapproval of this harsh result. Members of the

54

See, e.g., Western Assurance Co. v. Hann, 78 So. 232 (Ala. 1971); Roach-Strayhan-Holland Post v. Continental
Ins. Co., 112 So. 2d 680 (La. 1959); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Linwood Elevator, 130 So. 2d 262, 270 (Miss. 1961);
Evans Plantation, Inc. v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 58 So. 2d 797, 798 (Miss. 1952).

55

KING, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 21.

56

See Orin, supra note 44, at 93.

57

KING, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 13 (“Many homeowners incorrectly believe that their
standard homeowners policies automatically provide coverage against flooding, when in fact an additional flood
policy will be needed.”).
58

Michael F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
329, 333 (2006).

59

See Orin, supra note 44, at 100.

60

See, e.g., Rosenberg, Portner & Stool, supra note 24, at 155 (noting that ACC language in property insurance
contracts “would exclude water damage even if the levee system contributed to allowing the water to enter the
city”).
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Louisiana legislature have striven to invalidate ACC clauses by statute.61 These legislative
efforts have proven unsuccessful thus far.62
b. Hurricane Katrina-related litigation
Insurance companies have denied multitudes of Katrina victims’ property insurance
claims, resulting in a high volume of litigation centered on causation issues and the
enforceability of ACC clauses. Such lawsuits are expected to continue for quite some time.63
To date, the most important court battles regarding the enforceability of ACC clauses
have occurred in Mississippi. In two cases that were litigated in the District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, Judge Senter held that the ACC clauses at issue are ambiguous
and therefore unenforceable.64 The Fifth Circuit overturned these rulings, holding in both cases
that the ACC language is unambiguous, valid, and enforceable as a matter of Mississippi law.65
In Louisiana, it remains to be seen whether an insurer may employ an ACC clause to override the
efficient proximate cause doctrine when hurricane winds and water act concurrently to damage
property.66

61

See Orin, supra note 44, at 96 (“In 2005, and again in 2006, State Sen. Julie Quinn (R-Metairie) and State Rep.
Tim Burns (R-Mandeville) have proposed legislation precluding the enforcement of these clauses. Both times, the
proposed legislation died during the session.”).

62

Id.

63

KING, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that litigation “over the interpretation of ‘water
damage’ exclusion and the ‘ACC’ clauses could continue for months and even years”).
64

Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., No. 1:05CV559 LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 1442489 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006).

65

Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507
F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2007).

66

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2007) (The court declined to “address
whether insurers may contract around the efficient-proximate-cause rule under Louisiana law” because, in the case
at bar, “there are not two independent causes of the plaintiffs’ damages at play; the only force that damaged the
plaintiffs’ properties was flood.”).
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In Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Judge Senter refused to enforce
the ACC language in a Nationwide homeowner’s insurance policy.67 Plaintiffs Paul and Julie
Leonard sued Nationwide, their property insurer, to recover under their homeowner’s policy for
the extensive damage their home sustained during Hurricane Katrina. The Leonards’
Nationwide policy provided coverage for wind damage and “[d]irect loss caused by rain . . .
driven through [the] roof or wall openings made by direct action of wind. . . .”68 However, the
policy contained an ACC clause which bars recovery if any insured loss acts concurrently with
“flood, surface water, waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body of water . . . whether or not driven
by wind.”69 In short, the Leonards’ policy covers wind damage but not water damage, except for
water damage caused by rain that enters through a wind-created opening in the structure.70
The ground floor of the Leonard residence sustained extensive water damage after a
storm surge inundated the house.71 Hurricane Katrina’s winds, however, caused minimal
damage to the Leonards’ roof. The wind destroyed only a few shingles, and the water-tight
integrity of the roof was not compromised.72 Following an appraisal by Nationwide’s adjuster,
Nationwide sent a check to the Leonards for $1661.17 to cover the damaged roof.73 The
Leonards’ experts, however, determined that the damages totaled $130,235.59, and that

67

Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 694.

68

Id. at 688 (quoting the Nationwide policy).

69

Id (quoting the Nationwide policy).

70

Id. at 693.

71

Id. at 689.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 690.
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$47,365.41 was attributable to wind.74 Ultimately, Judge Senter found that “[a]lmost all of the
damage to the Leonard residence is attributable to the incursion of water,”75 and therefore
awarded a mere $1,994.80 to the Leonards.
Turning his attention to the ACC clause issue, Judge Senter held that the ACC language
in the Nationwide policy is ambiguous because the policy as a whole purports to provide
coverage for wind damage, yet the ACC clause operates to deny coverage when wind (an insured
peril) acts concurrently with water (an excluded peril) to cause a loss.76 Judge Senter concluded
that such a result would contravene well-established Mississippi law.77
On August 30, 2007, the Fifth Circuit overruled Judge Senter’s ruling in Leonard with
respect to the ACC clause, holding that Nationwide’s ACC language is enforceable as a matter of
Mississippi law.78 The court concluded that the ACC clause in Nationwide’s policy is
unambiguous and does not violate Mississippi case law, public policy, or statutory law. 79 In
reaching this conclusion, the Leonard court recognized that Mississippi follows the efficient
proximate cause rule by default in insurance disputes.80 Under this rule, a Mississippi
policyholder would recover if she was able to show that wind was the efficient proximate cause
of the loss, even if an excluded peril such as flooding contributed to the loss.81

74

Id.

75

Id. at 695

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007).

79

Id. at 436.

80

Id. at 431.

81

Id. at 432 (citing Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boatner, 254 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1971)).
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ACC language would abrogate the efficient proximate cause doctrine if found valid.
Although Mississippi courts have upheld ACC clauses in earth-movement cases,82 the Leonard
court noted that no Mississippi state court has definitively decided whether ACC clauses are
valid in the context of property damage from a hurricane.83 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Nationwide’s ACC language does not violate Mississippi case law and proceeded to make
“an educated ‘Erie guess’ as to how the Mississippi Supreme Court would resolve the issue.”84
Next, the court held that Nationwide’s ACC clause does not offend the public policy of
Mississippi.85 Mississippi contract law holds that parties may contract around common-law
causation principles as long as the contract does not violate public policy, and the Leonard court
emphasized that Mississippi’s adoption of the efficient proximate cause doctrine was not for
public policy reasons.86 Thus, the court reasoned, Nationwide’s ACC language is not
inconsistent with public policy.
In addition, the court found no Mississippi statute that “mandate[s] that insurance policies
reflect the efficient proximate causation doctrine.”87 Finally, the court held that the ACC
language is unambiguous.88 In so holding, the court dealt a punishing blow to Plaintiffs
82

Id. at 433 (citing Boteler v. State Farm Cas. Ins. Co., 876 So.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding
the validity of a State Farm policy which excluded all damage as a result of earth movement)). The Leonard court
also cited a Mississippi insurance law treatise which states that the earth-movement cases demonstrate the “clear
trend in Mississippi state and federal courts . . . to treat the issue of causation in this context as one controlled by the
insurance policy, and not by public policy or common law.” MISS. INS. LAW & PRAC. § 15:15.

83

Leonard, 499 F.3d at 431.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 435.

86

Id (noting that Mississippi was not motivated by public policy reasons in adopting the efficient proximate cause
doctrine).

87

Id. at 435.

88

Id. at 436.
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embattled with their insurance companies because the court’s decision effectively removed the
doctrine of contra proferentum from a Plaintiff’s arsenal. Under the doctrine of contra
proferentum, ambiguous contract provisions are construed against the drafter—i.e., the insurer.
Once ACC language is declared unambiguous, it will be given its plain meaning by the courts
and will not be construed against the insurer.
The Leonard court did acknowledge, however, that Nationwide’s ACC clause does not
negate the clause that permits recovery if “a policyholder’s roof is blown off in a storm, and rain
enters through the opening.”89 Thus, the policy unambiguously permits recovery for water
damage if a policyholder’s roof is blown off in a hurricane, allowing rain to enter and destroy the
interior, but not if a storm surge enters through the same opening and causes identical water
damage.
Barely two months after deciding Leonard, the Fifth Circuit in Tuepker v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co.90 reversed yet another of Judge Senter’s ACC clause rulings, again holding
that the ACC language at issue is unambiguous.91 Thus, “the ACC Clause in State Farm’s policy
overrides the efficient proximate cause doctrine.”92 The State Farm policy in Tuepker is largely
similar to the Nationwide policy in Leonard in that it covers wind damage but excludes losses
caused by water damage from flood, tidal water, etc.93 Unlike Nationwide’s ACC clause, State
Farm’s ACC clause is preceded by the following language: “We do not insure under any
coverage for any loss which would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of the
89

Id. at 431.

90

507 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2007).

91

Id. at 354.

92

Id. at 356.

93

Id. at 351.
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following excluded events.”94 Adhering to its decision in Leonard, the Tuepker court held that
this language does not render State Farm’s ACC clause ambiguous.95 In fact, this language
arguably makes the State Farm policy more lenient than the Nationwide policy in Leonard. For
example, if wind destroys a roof and a storm surge subsequently destroys the interior, the State
Farm policy covers the damaged roof even though the storm surge is an excluded event.96 After
all, “such roof loss did occur in the absence of any listed excluded peril.”97

IV.

Impact on Public Adjusting
Public adjusters face a significantly more challenging task when representing a client

whose insurance policy contains an ACC clause. Because insurance companies have the ability
to deny recovery altogether by adding ACC clauses to their policies, and because most courts
have bestowed their judicial blessings on this practice, public adjusters face an uphill battle when
insured and uninsured risks contribute to a loss.
Until very recently, the practice of public adjusting by a non-attorney was illegal in
Louisiana because it was considered to be the unauthorized practice of law.98 Despite this fact,
licensed public adjusters from foreign jurisdictions “flocked to [Louisiana] in the wake of
[Hurricane Katrina]” to offer their services.99 In response to this influx of foreign public
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adjusters, the Louisiana Insurance Commissioners promulgated Rule 16, which permits out-ofstate public adjusters to work in Louisiana.100 Rule 16 requires all such public adjusters to
register with the state’s Insurance Department and prohibits public adjusters from receiving
contingent fees.101 Louisiana subsequently reversed its longstanding forbiddance of public
adjusting by non-lawyers in 2006 with the enactment of The Louisiana Public Adjuster Act.102
This new Act regulates public adjusters by requiring that all prospective adjusters pass a
licensing exam, among other things.103 In keeping with Emergency Rule 16, public adjusters are
prohibited from receiving contingent fees for their services.104 The Mississippi Insurance
Department enacted an emergency rule analogous to Louisiana’s Emergency Rule 16 on
September 16, 2005.105 Soon afterwards, Mississippi passed House Bill No. 1524, which
regulates the public adjusting profession.106
Following the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Leonard and Tuepker, public adjusters working
on behalf of Hurricane Katrina victims in Louisiana and Mississippi107 may no longer
successfully argue that an insured’s policy contains an ambiguous ACC clause that should be
construed against the insurer. Instead, public adjusters must now rely solely on the physical
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evidence of property damage in arguing a claim. Unless a public adjuster can show that an ACC
clause should not apply given the nature of the damage, the insured’s claim will likely be denied
in full if insured perils and excluded risks acted together to damage her home.
Perhaps the most obvious way that a public adjuster can demonstrate the inapplicability
of an ACC clause is to argue that a single covered peril, rather than a combination of several
different events, caused the damage to an insured’s home. An insured whose lost her entire
house to Hurricane Katrina will surely prevail if her public adjuster can show that the house was
completely destroyed by a covered peril before the action of any excluded perils. For example,
assume that an insurance adjuster decides that a policyholder’s house was destroyed by the
concurrent action of wind and flood. As a result, the insurer denies the policyholder’s claim in
full. If a public adjuster can demonstrate that the hurricane’s winds completely destroyed the
house before any flooding occurred, the policyholder is entitled to recover under her policy,
notwithstanding the existence of an ACC clause. Even though ACC clauses purport to exclude
coverage whenever “other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event
to produce the loss,”108 this language will only preclude recovery where excluded perils actually
play a part in causing or producing a loss. Thus, if an insured risk entirely obliterates a structure
before an excluded event arrives at the scene, the excluded event cannot have contributed to the
loss. In other words, if floodwaters sweep away a home that had already been reduced to a pile
of rubble by the wind, the water damage did not cause the loss in any way. Whenever possible, a
public adjuster should argue that a single covered peril caused all of the damage before the
advent of the excluded peril and that, as a result, ACC language does not apply. This approach
portends great battles over causation and the exact sequence of events that caused the damage.
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Public adjusters may also be able to recover partial losses for insureds whose homes
sustained damage from both wind and water. Of course, a public adjuster faced with such a case
will prevail only if the insured’s policy contains a clause which permits partial recovery, such as
the clause in the Tuepker’s State Farm policy which denies coverage for damage which would
not have occurred in the absence of an excluded peril.109 This type of clause allows recovery for
losses caused solely by an insured peril, even if an excluded peril subsequently causes further
damage. If a public adjuster can show that the initial damage was caused by an insured peril
(e.g., wind) that occurred in the absence of an excluded peril (e.g., storm surge), recovery is
proper despite the presence of an ACC clause in the insured’s policy. Great scientific battles
over the sequence of events and the proportion of damage from wind versus water are expected.

Conclusion
The Fifth Circuit’s judicial approval of ACC clauses in Leonard and Tuepker will likely
produce harsh results for people whose homes perished in Hurricane Katrina. Although the
presence of an ACC clause in an insured’s insurance policy complicates the public adjuster’s
task, it is certainly possible for public adjusters to help their clients to recover under their
policies. Indeed, the present landscape may likely generate a high volume of business for public
adjusters, whose expertise is doubtless in especially high demand given the large-scale denial of
Katrina victims’ claims and the foreboding ACC language embedded in homeowners’ policies.
Because Louisiana has not yet seen much Hurricane Katrina-related litigation regarding the
validity of ACC clauses under Louisiana law, public adjusters operating in Louisiana should
keep abreast of the Louisiana legal scene and any developing changes in the law.
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